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CHAPTER l 
TRADITIONAL KOREA 
Before we proceed with this account of the culture of contemporary 
North Korea, it is necessary to describe briefly some outstanding features of 
the culture of pre-Communist times as a frame of reference for un- 
derstanding modern conditions. Knowledge of the pre-Communist culture 
of Korea is useful in another way, since, as later passages will show, the 
undesirable features of traditional life have been a center of attention in 
Communist North Korea. The deplorable conditions of former times have 
been thoroughly exploited as an aid in ideological indoctrination. 
By "traditional Korea," I mean principally the Yi Dynasty (1392-1910), 
which was followed by Japanese colonial rule until 1945. Although some 
important cultural traits including modern technology and social, economic, 
and political institutions were added during the period of Japanese control, 
innovations brought by the Japanese appear to have had little effect on the 
core of the traditional culture. The sketch that follows is based primarily 
upon early ethnographic descriptions made by Korean scholars and foreign 
missionaries. 
During the reign of the Koryo Dynasty (935-1392), which preceded the 
Yi Dynasty, Buddhism provided the principal ideology for governmental 
operation. The state was dominated by warriors and Buddhist monks, and 
scholars were virtually eliminated from positions of political authority. The 
succeeding Yi Dynasty launched its reign as a reaction against political 
domination by Buddhism and by warriors. For the scholarly class, which had 
long been alienated from political power, the founding of the Yi Dynasty was 
a great victory over the warriors and Buddhist monks. The new ruling class, 
largely consisting of scholars, enthusiastically adopted Confucianism as a 
political ideology, particularly Neo-Confucianism as revised by Chu Hsi of 
the Sung Dynasty of China, and called themselves subjects of the Emperor of 
the Ming Dynasty of China. Yi Korea became a tribute state of China. 
Although Confucianism was adopted as an antithesis of Buddhism, it deeply 
penetrated every aspect of the sociocultural system of Yi Korea. Buddhism 
declined greatly in importance. Following the loss of its material basis by the 
expropriation of vast areas of land owned by Buddhist temples and the 
concomitant growth of strong governmental opposition which lasted 
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throughout the entire Yi era, Korean Buddhism lost the glory of its past and 
failed to maintain close relationships with the people in their everyday lives. 
Yi Korea was a highly stratified society. Four social classes were 
formally recognized: yangban, chungin, sangmin, and ch bnmin. The term 
yangban, literally meaning "both classes," once denoted both military and 
civil officials. After political power came into the hands of the scholarly class, 
the term changed to mean the class of scholar-officials, which constituted the 
privileged, ruling class monopolizing governmental positions. The Yi 
Dynasty was created as a result of a military coup, and those who had actively 
taken a part in the coup or helped afterward in founding the monarchy were 
given yangban status as well as governmental posts. People of lower social 
class were supposedly able to attain yangban status by passing civil service 
examinations, but this policy seems never actually to have been followed 
during the entire duration of the Yi Dynasty. Only descendants of yangban 
families were allowed to take the various examinations. 
Chungin, "middle men," is a general term for administrative func- 
tionaries at various levels of government. These included the profes- 
sional clerical staffs of ministries and offices of the central government 
in the capital and elsewhere in the nation. Also included in this class were 
interpreters, astronomers, physicians, county clerks, and professional 
military officers. Although they were few in number, the chungin, in 
particular the county clerks (ajon), were very important in the people's lives, 
since they were the means of communication between the rulers and the 
ruled, and, locally at least, were the rulers in fact. 
About three-fourths of the population consisted of commoners, 
sangmin. Peasant cultivators were the largest single occupational group and 
sub-class. Merchants and artisans were also commoners, but their social 
status was below that of cultivators. The commoner class alone was subject to 
taxation and military service. At the bottom of the social strata were the 
ch'onmin, or "despised people." These were divided into two occupational 
categories, public and private. Ch bnmin in public service included public 
entertainers, court maids (servants), male servants in government service, 
servants in government travel stations and rest houses, jailkeepers, official 
female slaves, fugitives from justice, and criminals. The private class 
included Buddhist monks and nuns, messengers, actors and entertainers, 
female shamans, professional mourners and keepers of memorial tablets, 
executioners, shoemakers, and an outcast group called paekchong. Among 
the despised classes, thepaekchong were uniquely low, defiled, and defiling 
to others. They engaged in small handicrafts such as basketry, butchering, 
leatherworking, and straw-sandal making, and lived in segregated com- 
munities (Passin 1956:37-44). 
In Yi Korea, Confucianism had served as the ideological support for the 
yangban class in ruling the people and justifying the social hierarchy, a sub- 
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ject that will later be discussed in detail. Neo-Confucian elements utilized by 
the yangban spread rapidly, principally because detailed knowledge of them 
constituted the core of the civil service examinations. Since these 
examinations, called kwago, were the only legitimate avenue to officialdom, 
young males of theyangban class devoted much effort to studying Confucian 
classics. 
Confucian influence on the Korean culture of the time may be 
distinguished by two major aspects, Confucian metaphysics and Confucian 
ethics. Prominent Confucian intellectuals of Yi Korea engaged in endless 
debates on various philosophical subjects including human nature, "the 
supreme ultimate," man's place in the universe, and cosmological 
speculation. Confucian metaphysics provided rich resources for these 
intellectual exercises, particularly during the second half of the Yi Dynasty. 
Beyond having importance in factional disputes in Yi Korea's politics, 
however, these intellectual activities and pastimes seem to have had little 
direct importance to the nation as a whole and were exclusively a custom of 
the eIite. 
Confucian ethics were important to everyone and constituted the moraI 
standards of Yi society. During the period of over five hundred years of the 
Yi Dynasty, the Confucian system of ethics became institutionalized and 
firmly integrated into Korean culture. Confucian ethics concerned primarily 
rules and standards of human relations, among which the ideals of the "five 
human relationships" constituted the core: the relationship between father 
and son, master and subject, husband and wife, the aged and the young, 
and between friends. The ideals of privilege and obligation of the five 
relationships are said to have developed on the basis of the relatively 
egalitarian society of China, and all five precepts were organized into a 
harmonious whole. But, as the Introduction notes, when these precepts 
reached Korea they underwent various changes. Most notable among these is 
the great emphasis placed on the relationship between father and son, which 
became far more important in Korea than the other relationships. Filial piety 
became the supreme virtue of the Yi era, and all other relationships were 
believed to stem from it. For example, it was believed that loyalty to one's 
master could not be achieved unless filial piety to one's parents, especially to 
the father, had first been demonstrated. In cases of conflict between filial 
piety and loyalty to the ruler, the former held pre-eminence. It was not 
uncommon in Yi Korea for an exemplary son to be rewarded by the court in 
various ways, including exemption from taxes, the erection in his honor of 
monumental columns or temples, and even appointment to public office 
(Dallet 1954:129). Moreover, upon the death of his father, a proper son was 
expected to resign from his government post and give himself over to 
mourning. In some cases, a son built near the parent's tomb a small house in 
which he remained for several years, thereby acquiring high renown for 
saintliness and veneration (ibid.: 136). 
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The marked difference that existed between the Japanese and Korean 
adaptations of Confucianism is worthy of note. As in Yi Korea, Tokugawa 
Japan (1603-1868) adopted Neo-Confucianism as a state philosophy. Japan 
also accepted the idea of the five relationships. Among the five precepts, 
however, the relationship between master and subject was given supreme 
attention, as expressed in the concept of chu, the sense of duty to the 
emperor. As Ruth Benedict (1946:119) described the circumstances, when 
filial piety came into conflict with one's obligation to the emperor, chu stood 
first. The Japanese case provides a key toward gaining an understanding of 
the Confucianism of traditional Korea. Korea lacked the extremely 
nationalistic ideals of Japan and failed to integrate members of society into a 
national network. The Korean emphasis upon filial piety, coupled with the 
importance placed upon purity of lines of descent, discouraged social 
integration on the national level. Close unity in Yi society was confined to 
lineages sharing descent from prestigious ancestors. 
The Confucian emphasis on legitimacy of birth was accepted and widely 
applied in Korea, chiefly in the matter of dynastic succession. Endless 
struggles over the transmission of political power during the Yi Dynasty 
centered on the question of legitimacy. On the family level, the emphasis on 
legitimacy resulted in strong social discrimination against illegitimate 
children. The stress on purity of descent, which was supported and justified 
by the principle of legitimacy, eliminated illegitimate children from 
succession in family lines, even when families lacked legitimate sons, and 
barred them from all avenues toward officialdom (Pak Chi-won 1957). 
Korea accepted almost every ceremonial symbol of Confucianism, 
particularly those of Chu Hsi Chia Li (Chu Hsi's Family Rituals). Confucian 
ceremonies of marriage, funerals, post-funereal mourning rites, and other 
ceremonies related to ancestor worship were strictly observed without any 
substantial modification of their Chinese form. Rites of ancestor veneration 
were especially important in maintaining solidarity among kin, although 
these ceremonies otherwise had little importance in social unification. 
The basic framework of Korean kinship terminology is that of 
Confucian Chinese culture. Koreans recognized a wide range of kin 
relationships with distinctive kin terms, the majority of which were of 
Chinese origin. Even today, native Korean terms exist only for close kin. The 
Chinese system of wu fu, the classification of kin by five mourning costumes 
according to their degree of consanguineal relationship, was accepted in 
Korea without modification. 
Since agriculture was the major and virtually the only source of state 
revenue in Yi Korea, it is useful to examine the landholding system of the 
time in order to understand the circumstances of life of most of the 
population. From the beginning, the Yi government took no steps to give 
ownership of land to its tillers. Although a statewide land survey was 
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conducted at the outset of the Yi regime in an effort to gather accurate 
information on the area of arable land, the redistribution of land that 
followed reaffirmed the continuity of the old class system, leaving the vast 
majority of the population as tenant farmers. The only marked difference in 
land hoIdings as compared with circumstances under the Koryo Dynasty was 
that Buddhist temples ceased to be major landlords. The arable lands 
previously owned by the temples came into the hands of the yangban 
bureaucrats. 
In Yi Korea, the state was the supreme landlord of the nation, and no 
private individual or kinship group could "own" land. This circumstance 
made the majority of the rural population subject to the manipulations of the 
yangban, who actually controlled the land. Cultivated land was divided into 
two categories, private land (sajon) and public land (kongion). The 
government controlled both types of land either directly or indirectly. 
"Private land" meant land to which private individuals were given by the 
state the right of use but not of ownership. Civil servants were given fixed 
amounts of land according to their rank, the yields from which were regarded 
as payment for their services. A few people, called merit subjects (kongsin), 
were given land for distinguished service in the establishment of the Yi 
Dynasty. In addition, the monarch often granted land to people who excelled 
in service to the state by acts such as successfully completing diplomatic 
missions or providing information about rebellions. People who received land 
in this way were nearly always yangban. According to custom, the 
landholders did not themselves work as cultivators. Some tilled their land by 
using slaves or poor peasants as laborers, but the majority rented their lands. 
Thus, in the management of private land intermediaries existed between the 
supreme landlord (the state) and the actual tillers, but these intermediaries 
were the de facto landlords. 
Civil servants were required to return their land to the state when they 
left their posts. Except for forty-three "merit subjects" who were given land 
and slaves for their services in assisting to found the monarchy and who were 
allowed to control their land permanently, holders of private land 
theoretically kept the land only during their lifetimes. Upon death, the land 
was to be returned to the government. This rule, however, was often violated 
by descendants with political power, who retained rights to the land as de 
facto private property. 
Public land was utilized directly by the central government or its 
agencies to finance governmental operations. Like private land, some of the 
holdings were cultivated by private individuals of the peasant class on a 
rental basis. Otherwise, public land was cultivated by slaves, soldiers, and, to 
a greater extent, by corvke labor, or uncompensated contribution of "owed" 
labor, of peasant tenant farmers. The income from public land went directly 
to the central government or its agencies. In this matter public land differed 
from private land since it involved no private individuals as intermediaries. 
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Tenant farmers cultivating private land paid in rental at least 60% of the 
total proceeds. Fifty per cent was paid in rent and 10% as agricultural tax 
(Pak Chi-won 1960:271). In addition, tenants paid other kinds of taxes, 
which at one time reached a total of forty-four kinds (Ho Chong-ho 1965:81). 
As noted earlier, they were also required to contribute uncompensated labor 
in the cultivation of public land. Peasants similarly worked without 
compensation in various public construction projects, and occasionally they 
were required to pay tribute of local specialty products to the central 
government. 
Monarchs of Yi Korea were characteristically weak, and the yangban 
bureaucrats actually ruled the people, showing little concern toward 
improving their conditions of life. As time passed, an increase in the 
yangban population and the limited number of official positions resulted in a 
long succession of factional disputes among the yangban class and c o m p t  
government. The demoralization of Yi bureaucrats is well recorded in the 
monumental ethnographic works by the scholars of Silhakp 'a, the School of 
Practical Learning, such as Song Hyon (1439-1504), Yu Ryong-won (1622- 
1673), Yi Ik (1682-1763), Pak Chi-won (1737-1805), Pak Chae-ga (1750-180% 
and Chong Yag-yong (1762-1836). The ruling elite spent a good deal of its 
time in reciting poems and taking a part in philosophical discussions, 
neglecting official duties. In many cases, the local clerks (ajon) were the 
actual rulers. As Chong Yag-yong (also known as Chong Ta-san) describes 
them, the ajon regarded the farmers as their land to till, people from whom 
they could extract money in the same way as the farmers reap a livelihood 
from their soil (1969, Vol. I:269). Chong Yag-yong reports that it was not 
uncommon for the ajon to collect from the farmers as much as four times the 
amount of the agricultural taxes which they actually delivered to the Board of 
Taxation in the capital (ibid,:202-203). Serving as intermediaries, the ajon 
operated in their own political and financial interests, cheating their 
superiors and similarly manipulating and exploiting the farmers. County 
magistrates were quite often replaced because of pressures of factionalism, 
but the ajon usually remained indefinitely at the same posts because they had 
good knowledge of local circumstances that was valuable for administrative 
purposes. For the average farmer, the ajon were the class which was most 
hated and feared. 
During the second half of the Yi Dynasty, the bureaucratic system had 
become so corrupt that its numerous official positions were overtly or covertly 
purchased. Oh Chi-yong (1940:98) states that appointment to a high public 
office was regarded as "going out to make money or to become a gold mine 
contractor." Since those who held such offices had invested a good deal of 
money in bribes to gain their appointments, it followed that they would seek 
prompt recovery of their investments by abusing their executive powers. Such 
impropriety on the part of officials was firmly institutionalized during the 
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latter half of the dynasty. Yi Ik (1972:83) describes the conditions of the time 
in a way that appears to be somewhat exaggerated, stating that if bribery and 
extortion were eliminated, the high officials and local clerks could hardly 
have survived for lack of food. Harassment of farmers by such ill-founded 
charges as "undutifulness to parents," "failure to maintain cordiality with 
close relatives and neighbors," "committing incest," and "failure to pay 
respect to the yangban," was one of the common means of extorting money 
(Oh Chi-yong 1940:99). The peasants' attitude toward the villageyangban is 
we11 illustrated by their custom of frightening their children by telling them 
that the yangban is coming and otherwise menacing them with these evil 
beings (Dallet 1954: 104). 
When impoverished families found it necessary to abandon their homes 
because of inability to pay taxes, their neighbors or relatives were expected to 
assume the responsibility of payment (Yi Ik 1972:lOl). It was not uncommon 
for poor villagers voluntarily to become slaves of the relatively few wealthy 
landlords to escape from the harshness of the yangban (Dallet 1954:115). 
Peasants worked out strategies to cope with governmental corruption. On the 
village level, communal funds to which all village households contributed 
were the most common way of meeting the extortive demands of ajon and 
yangban, Communal funds were also used to pay for public facilities used for 
marriages, burials, and the like, and they were also used for unforeseen 
expenses other than the extortions of the bureaucrats (ibid.:113). Some 
villages formed mutual aid associations called igye which functioned solely to 
bribe local government officials to reduce exorbitant taxes (Ryoksa Kwahak, 
1965, No. 1:63). Landlords often initiated among their tenants the 
establishment of mutual aid associations called hogye to bear the 
responsibility for the payment of rents collectively when necessary, If a tenant 
failed to pay his rent because of a poor harvest, the association took the 
responsibility (ibid.:63). Thus the incomes of the landlords were guaranteed, 
but the tenants had no such safeguards against misfortune of any kind. 
The manner of political control of Yi Korea appears to have exerted 
strong influence on the nation's social organization and especially on its 
techn&ogical development. As noted earlier, among the yangban, the most 
vigorous years of the lifespan were devoted to preparation for the civil service 
examination. The agony of years of preparation was rewarded by the 
omnipotence of bureaucratic power, if the yangban succeeded in passing the 
examinations and was appointed to high office. The power of office could 
bring almost anything: particularly, it brought wealth and prominence to 
one's lineage, which, in return, often brought high positions for the 
generations that followed. But the strong dominance by scholar-officials in 
Yi Korea seriously inhibited the growth of one of the essential forces of socio- 
cultural development, that is, the development of technology, According to 
the Chinese-derived occupational rating generally accepted in traditional 
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Korea, scholar-officials (sa) had the topmost rating. They were followed in 
descending order by peasants (nong), craftsmen and artisans (kong), and 
merchants (sang). Far below, and apart from all others, were the ch'onmin, 
the despised people. The three categories of commoners composed a single 
class, but they were not treated equally. Although the merchants, who were 
mostly peddlers, had the lowest status among the commoners, they were 
relatively free from institutional exploitation by the yangban class. Toward 
the end of Yi Korea, the merchants acquired wealth and developed into a 
social class with great political power. The circumstances of craftsmen and 
artisans differed. To the end of the Yi era, they were looked down upon and 
exploited by the members of the yangban class, who were not interested in 
encouraging them to improve their skills and often underpaid them. As a 
result, craftsmen and artisans took little pride in their work. The noted 
scholar Yu Hyong-won (1962 I:165-166) describes the circumstance under 
which this class of citizens lived during the second half of the seventeenth 
century. Whenever the court in the capital needed their services, they were 
brought in, but they were paid poorly on the grounds that the work was for 
the court. Local governmental authorities treated craftsmen and artisans in 
the same way, as did influential families that were not of the bureaucratic 
class. Under these circumstances, craftsmen and artisans were reluctant to 
do their work skillfully for fear of increased exploitation, and no stimulus 
toward improving performances and techniques existed. 
Furthermore, local administrative officials tended not to care about 
technological innovations, since political activities at the capital were their 
major concern, Generally, the most important techniques of artisans and 
craftsmen were barely transmitted and preserved, without improvement, 
through patrilineal lines of succession as a means of gaining a livelihood. The 
unfavorable conditions under which the craftsmen and artisans worked, 
however, resulted in the loss of various technological processes. The 
manufacture of ceramics is a noteworthy example. Korean ceramic 
techniques were greatly admired by the Japanese and were introduced into 
Japan in the latter part of the sixteenth century, when Japanese military 
forces under the command of Toyotomi Hideyoshi invaded Korea but were 
unsuccessful in establishing control of the nation. These techniques are 
generally regarded as a great contribution toward the development of 
Japanese pottery making (Reischauer and Fairbank 1958590; Moose 
1911:139). The most advanced of these techniques did not survive in Korea. 
Henderson (1969:136) states, "It is fairly clear that the end of a brilliant 
ceramic industry which had lasted fifteen hundred years in Korea was 
motivated in important part by the fact that the potters were despised 
specialists in a society which, in 1883, was offering increasing mobility for 
those many within it who were not sharply identified as specialists." 
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The Confucian class system of Yi Korea resulted in still another 
condition fatal to economic and technological development, a distaste for 
manual labor. J. Robert Moose, an American missionary who spent ten years 
in Korea during the final stage of the Yi Dynasty, describes the yangban as 
follows (1911:99,101): 
The fact that he is a gentleman is sufficient ground fot him to excuse himself from 
everything in the shape and form of common labor. He is born to rule-that is to 
hold office and get his living by the Iabor of other men's hands. The passion to 
hoId office and to rule seems to be one of the strongest in the breast of the yang- 
ban; to obtain worldly honor and power is the goal which has been placed for him, 
and toward the obtaining of this he bends whatever energy he may be disposed to 
use. 
Our viIlage gentlemen bangban] is strictIy opposed to undertaking anything that 
looks like manual Iabor. He may be ever so poor-yes, even dependent on others 
for his daily rice-but to get out and work is out of his line of business. It is no 
disgrace for him to go hungry, but to engage in any sort of manual labor would at  
once lower his standing as a gentleman and ruin his prospects for future 
promotion along the lines which gentlemen only are supposed to travel. 
In summary, Yi Korea may be described as a society that never achieved 
a high degree of integration and that contained various self-destructive 
features. The ancient Confucian ideal of the state as a family never 
materialized, and on the village level, the population was exploited by the 
bureaucrats and the wealthy yangban families. The emphasis upon filial 
piety and ancestral worship helped to maintain solidarity among members of 
kin groups, but it made no contribution toward national integration and, if 
anything, served as a divisive force. Subordination of the economy to the 
interests of politics, the lack of prestige for technical skill, the yangban'~ 
distaste for manual labor, and the poverty and otherwise miserable 
conditions of life of the majority of the population appear to have invited the 
collapse of the social system. 
In the pages which follow, as modern conditions of Communist life are 
discussed under topical headings, additional and more detailed information 
will be given on relevant social arrangements, associated customs, 
technological matters, and other cultural elements of traditional or Yi Korea. 
Innovations occurring during the years of Japanese control in the twentieth 
century will similarly be discussed. 
